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Why China Established the Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank
Daniel C.K Chow*
ABSTRACT

On January 16, 2016, China officially opened the Asia
InfrastructureInvestment Bank (AIIB) for business, representing
what might be a seismic shift in economic power from the United
States to China. The AIIB creates a challenge to the U.S.dominated World Bank and InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF),
two venerable internationalfinancial institutions created at the
end of World War II. The World Bank lends money to developing
countries to promote economic development, but these loans come
with conditions called the Washington Consensus-a set of
policies designed to promote the use of private markets, protect
the environment, protect human and workers' rights, and foster
non-corruption in government, among other values.
Unlike the United States, China believes in a doctrine of
non-interference with the internal affairs of other countries.
China'sstance led the United States to argue that the AIIB would
not tie its loans to responsible social policies. Not only did the
United States refuse to join the AIB, but the United States also
attempted to dissuade its closest allies from joining. Despite U.S.
entreaties,however, all of the United States' closest allies (except
Japan)joined the AIIB, causing a political embarrassment for
the United States.
While the United States has been the underwriter of the
world's financial system for at least the past seven decades, the
rise of the AIIB could be the first indication that China will
succeed in its quest to displace the United States as the final
arbiter of the rules of international trade and finance in the
twenty-first century.

* Frank H. and Virginia A. Bazler Chair in Business Law, The Ohio State
University
Michael E. Moritz College of Law. Thanks to comments on this Article by the participants
in the conference, "China Rising" held at Harvard Law School on November 13, 2015.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 16, 2016, the Board of Governors of the Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) officially convened, with great
fanfare, for the first time at its permanent headquarters in Beijing and
declared the bank opened for business.' The Board officially elected Jin

1.
InauguralMeeting of the AIIB's Board of Governors ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT BANK (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.aiib.org/html/2016/NEWS_0117/85.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6BQS-RLYX] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
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Liqun, 2 a former Chinese finance minister, 3 as president of the AIIB 4 an outcome that was foreordained, since China is the driving force
behind the AIIB. 5 Not only did China first propose the AJIB in October
2013, but China has contributed the largest share of the $100 billion
initial capital of the AIIB, giving China the largest voting block and an
effective veto power over the decisions of the AIB. 6 Also unsurprising
was the absence of the United States from the ceremonies, as the
United States had strongly opposed the formation of the AJIB from the
time that China's President Xi Jinping first announced China's plans
to establish the AIIB in the fall of 2013. 7 Not only had the United

2.
See id. The Board of Governors is comprised of a representative from each of
the member countries and is the highest governing body of the AIIB. ASIAN
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE ASIAN
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK 13, http://www.aiib.org/uploadfile/2015/0814/

20150814022158430.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/JZU6-E4ZU]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) [hereinafter AIB Articles of Agreement]. At the January 16,
2016 meeting, thirty elected representatives served as governors from each of the current
members of the AIIB. Twenty-seven other countries were present as observers in
completing the process of formally joining the AIIB. Inaugural Meeting of the AIIB's
Board of Governors, supra note 1. On the next day, January 17, 2015, the AIIB Board of
Directors met for the first time. The Board of Governors elects the directors and is
allowed to delegate the running of the day-to-day operation of the AIIB to the Board of
Directors. AIB Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, at 1. The Board of Directors consists
of twelve directors and is chaired by Jin Liqun, the president of the AIIB. Inaugural
Meeting of the Board of Directors, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

INVESTMENT

BANK,

http://www.aiib.org/html/2016/NEWS_0118/86.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2016)
[https:/perma.c/Q2YG-YWNZ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016). For a further discussion of the
governance structure of the AIIB, see infra Part IV.A.
3.

AIIB

President,

ASIAN

INFRASTRUCTURE

INVESTMENT

BANK,

http://www.aiib.org/html/aboutus/President/
(last
visited
Oct.
12,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/MWM2-ZCV4] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
4.
Id.
5.
Jin was named as president-elect in August 2015 months before the AIIB
formally convened. At this point, China had a 30 percent stake in the AIIB, giving it
effective veto power. Mark Magnier, China's Jin Liqun Named PresidentElect of China
InfrastructureInvestment Bank, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.comI
articles/chinas-jin-liqun-named-president-elect-of-asian-infrastructure-investmentbank-1440421017 [https://perma.cc/7LWQ-ECQX] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
6.
China contributed $29.8 billion of the initial $100 billion of the basic capital
of the AIIB. The second largest contributor is India with $8.4 billion. China retains veto
power over all major decisions of the AIIB. Mark Magnier, How China Plans to Run the
AIIB: Leaner, with Veto, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-china-plans-to-run-aiib-leaner-with-veto-1433764079
[https:I/perma.cc/C32Q-TLST] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
7.
See Jane Perlez, China Creates a World Bank of its Own, and the U.S. Balks,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.comI2015/12/05Ibusiness/
international/china-creates-an-asian-bank-as-the-us-stands-aloof.html?_r=O
[https://perma.cc/6WCV-VTPW ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (discussing President Xi
Jinping's proposal of Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2013 at a meeting of top
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States spoken out against the formation of the AIIB, but the United
States had attempted to dissuade its closest allies from joining the
AIIB. 8 Despite U.S. efforts, however, dozens of the United States'
closest allies were present in Beijing as founding members of the AIIB,
including the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and South Korea,
leaving the United States and Japan on the outside. 9 The decision to
join the AIIB by the United States' allies was considered by the U.S.
media to be a major diplomatic defeat and an embarrassment for the
United States.' 0
China established the AIIB due, in no small part, to what it
perceived to be poor treatment by the United States. While the United
States and its allies dominate the World Bank and IMF, China has
minor, insignificant roles in both institutions, even though China has
the world's second largest economy. 1 ' The U.S. Congress deliberately
blocked efforts to give China a greater voice in the IMF 12 and the
United States has concluded the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, a vast free trade agreement, with most of the nations of
East Asia but deliberately excluded China from the negotiations. This
is hardly a friendly act, but rather the act of a rival with the intent to
contain China. 13 Since there was no realistic possibility of an expanded
role in the World Bank and the IMF commensurate with China's
economic power, and because China felt poorly treated by the United

leaders in Bali). The United States initially supported the idea but quickly changed
course as the Obama administration began a battle to limit the bank's influence. Id.
See id. (noting how the Obama administration, while initially endorsing the
8.
AIIB then began "a rear-guard battle to minimize its influence"); see also Mike Bird,
China'sNew Development Bank is Becoming a Massive Embarrassmentfor Obama, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-allies-joining-asianinfrastructure-investment-bank-aiib-embarrassment-2015-3?r=UK&IR=T
[https://perma.cc/F2TD-LKSJ ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) ('Try as it might, the US
government can't persuade its allies to stop joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank.").
9.
In total, the AIIB has fifty-seven founding members, including, in addition
to the countries mentioned in the text above, France, Italy, Brazil, Russia, and South
Africa. 50 Countries Sign the Articles of Agreement for the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK, http://www.aiib.org/
html/2015/NEWS 0629/11.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Z4H8-3VXP]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016); Bird, supra note 8.
10.
See Perlez, supra note 7 (declaring the involvement of United States' allies
in the bank to be a "humiliating diplomatic defeat" because the United States was
excluded).
11.
See infra text accompanying notes 102-07 (discussing China's low voting
share in other multilateral institutions). For a discussion of the size of China's economy,
see infra note 22.
See infra text accompanying note 107-09.
12.
13.
See infra text accompanying note 245 (explaining why the United States
excluded China from the TPP).
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States, China set up a rival institution in which China can play a
14
dominant role.
From the United States' perspective, the AIIB is an unwanted
intrusion in the multilateral financial system. The United States
opposed the AIIB for what it viewed as sound and convincing reasons
and not as a vendetta against China. The United States viewed the
AIIB as an unwanted rival to the World Bank and the IMF, two
venerable international financial institutions that have served as the
bedrock of the international financial system since the Bretton Woods
Conference held in Bretton, New Hampshire at the end of World War
i.15 The World Bank makes loans to developing countries to promote
infrastructure and economic development and the IMF makes loans to
16
countries faced with balance of payment problems.
Given China's track record, the United States argued that the
AIIB would become a rival to the World Bank and IMF in lending but
would not follow the best practices in international lending promoted
by these institutions, such as making loans to countries conditional on
the recipients' commitment to transparency, non-corruption in
government, environmental sustainability, and recognition of workers'
rates, among other conditions. 17 Instead, the United States reasoned
that China would attach few if any conditions to its loans based on a
track record of making loans to unstable governments, financing
construction for unnecessary infrastructure projects, and suddenly
8
uprooting entire villages without adequate compensation.'
According to the United States, China would use the AIIB to
further its own global ambitions and dictate its own rules for
international trade, which stand in stark contrast to the rules of the
current multilateral trading system dominated by the United States
and its close allies. 19 What proved unexpected and surprising to the
United States was that these pleas were ignored by almost all of the

14.
See Perlez, supra note 7 (stating Zheng Xili, often referred to as the AIIB's
godfather, first conceived of the idea for the AIIN when he was with the policy research
office of the Communist Party's Central Committee).
15.
For a discussion of the history of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the
functions of the World Bank and IMF, see infra Section II.A below.
16.
See infra Section II.A; infra note 71.
17.
See Perlez, supranote 7 ("The United States worries that China will use the
bank to set the global economic agenda on its own terms, forgoing the environmental
protections, human rights, anticorruption measures and other governance standards
long promoted by its Western counterparts.").
18.
See id.
19.
See id. (United States feared "that Beijing would use the bank as another
tool to project its influence"). For a more detailed discussion of how China differs from
the United States on the rules of the multilateral trading system in contained Party, see
infra Part III below.
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countries to 'which they were directed (Japan being the one
exception). 20 As one commentator noted, every country decided that a
small improvement in ties with China was more important than a
small deterioration in ties with the United States. 2 1 This is a
calculation that few countries would have made just a few decades
ago. 22 A telling blow is that many of the United States' closest western
European allies chose to join the AIIB. Especially galling to the United
States was the decision by the United Kingdom, the United States'
strongest ally, to ignore U.S. pleas to shun the AIIB. In most cases,
U.S. opposition to any important foreign policy decision would be
enough to dissuade the United Kingdom, and it was unprecedented for
the United Kingdom to take sides with China in a contentious battle
between the United States and its emerging rival, China, over
international financial governance. 23 But that is exactly what

20.
See infra text accompanying notes 116-31 (discussing U.S. efforts to
dissuade its allies from joining the AIIB).
21.
Bird, supra note 8.
22.
The reason why few countries would have chosen China over the United
States over an issue of international trade is that the United States dominated
international trade due to the sheer size of the U.S economy. A few decades ago, the
United States economy dwarfed that of China. Even as late as 2004, the U.S. economy
$11.667 trillion) was seven times the size of China's economy ($1.649 trillion). DANIEL
C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 33 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter
CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA]. By 2015, China had closed the gap. In 2015, the size
of the U.S economy as valued by Gross Domestic Product was $17.968 trillion whereas
China's GDP was $11.35 trillion. World GDP Ranking 2015, KNOEMA,
http://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2015-data-and-charts (last visited Oct.
1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/SL2R-LCRT] (archived Sept. 18, 2016). As measured by
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), China's economy has already surpassed the U.S.
economy as the largest in the world. Id. PPP measures compare what a consumer can
buy for its money in different countries. As a consumer can buy more for the money in
China, the size of China's economy is adjusted upwards. According to the IMF, using
PPP, China's economy is worth $17.6 trillion, slightly more than the $17.4 trillion for the
U.S. economy. This is significant because for the first time since 1872, the United States
has been knocked off the top spot as measured by PPP. Ben Carter, Is China's Economy
Really
the Largest in
the
World,
BBC
NEWS
(Dec.
16,
2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30483762 [https://perma.cc/NU6L-8D4G] (archived
Sept. 18, 2016). According to some estimates, even in absolute terms, for example
nominal GDP, China's economy is expected to overtake the United States in eleven years.
Elena Holodny, China's GDP is Expected to Surpass the US' in 11 Years, BuS. INSIDER
(June 24, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-gdp-is-expected-to-surpass-theus-in-11-years-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/SWT4-UVNY] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
23.
See American poodle to Chinese lapdog?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21646352-america-and-britainodds-over-how-deal-china-american-poodle-pekinese-lapdog
[https://perma.cc/3DKNQXE4] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (noting how it is extremely rare for Britain to take a
foreign policy stake at odds with the United States and that it is unprecedented for
Britain to side in a contentious international debate with China, a rival to the United
States).
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happened in this case: a diplomatic defeat that angered the United
24
States.
An indication of how serious a threat the AJIB poses to the United
States is contained in a statement by former Harvard University
President and former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers:
This past month may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its
role as the underwriter of the global economic system ....I can think of no event
since Bretton Woods comparable to the combination of China's effort to establish
a major new institution and the failure of the United States to persuade dozens
of its traditional allies, starting with Britain, to stay out. This failure of strategy
and tactics was a long time coming, and it should lead to a comprehensive review
of the U.S. approach to global economics. With China's economic size rivaling
that of the United States and emerging markets accounting for at least half of
world output, the global economic architecture needs substantial adjustment.
Political pressures from all sides in the United States have rendered the
architecture increasingly dysfunctional.25

What would lead a former U.S. cabinet official whose primary role
was to oversee the U.S. financial and banking system to suggest such
a seismic shift in economic power from the United States to China? Jin
Liqun, President of the AIB stated, in reference to the United States,
that "[h]istory has never set any precedent that an empire is capable
of governing the world forever. '26 Why does the establishment of the
AIIB portend this possible shift in power to China? As developed in this
Article, there are at least three reasons, and all of them should be of
major concern for the United States going forward.
First, the establishment of the AIIB brings within the control of
the Chinese Communist Party, for the first time, a prestigious
multilateral organization consisting of many of the closest allies of the
United States, but without the presence of the United States or
Japan. 27 As with any powerful institution in China, the AIIB, with its

24.
See id. (stating that the United States interpreted Britain's decision to join
the bank as siding with China). Perhaps the most defiant diplomatic blow of all to the
United States is that Taiwan, whose very survival in the post-War period depends on
the United States, has decided to apply for membership in the AIIB, but was rejected by
China. Jenny W. Hsu, China Thwarts Taiwan's Bid to be a FoundingMember of AIIB,
WALL ST. J. (April 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-thwarts-taiwans-bid-tobe-founding-member-of-aiib-1428899140 [https://perma.cc/2Y76-FZA2] (archived Sept.
18, 2016). For an additional discussion of Taiwan's history and its dependence on the
United States, see infra Section IJJ.B.
25.
Lawrence Summers, A Global Wake-Up Call for the U.S?, WASH. POST (Apr.
6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-global-wake-up-call-for-the-us/
2015/04/05/6f847ca4-da34-11e4-b3f2-607bd6l2aeac-story.html [https://perma.cc/EL6MPFL3] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
26.
Perlez, supranote 7.
27.
See infra Section N.A.
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permanent headquarters in Beijing, will ultimately be under the
control of the Chinese Communist Party, and the Party may use the
AIIB as an instrument to pursue its policy goals, as further explained
below. 28 It is possible that the Party will act with a light touch and not
use the AIIB to further its policy goals, but such a move would be
inconsistent with the Party's long history and ambitions. The Party has
dominated every governmental or non-governmental organization of
any importance in China since the founding of the People's Republic of
China; 29 it is possible, although unlikely, that the AIIB will be an
exception. Rather, more likely, is that the Party's role may not be
apparent to AIIB members, but there will be no doubt that, behind the
scenes, the Party will exercise ultimate control over the AIIB. 30 Control
over the AIIB, a powerful and prestigious multilateral organization
housed in China, will only enhance the Party's own status and prestige
within China and among the Chinese populace, further entrenching its
authority and power in the state. 31 This is an important achievement
for the State-Party obtained through establishing the AIIB.
Second, the State-Party in China may intend to use the AIIB to
32
write its own rules for international trade in the twenty-first century.
China might use the AIIB to compete directly with the World Bank and
the IMF in international lending for development and for balance of
payment problems. 33 Both the World Bank and the IMF are
institutions dominated by the United States and a few other developed
countries. 34 In particular, the World Bank and IMF serve to promote
U.S. policies in recipient countries. 35 These policies are embodied in
the so-called Washington Consensus-a set of political and economic
conditions that are attached to the granting of loans by the World Bank
and the IMF. 3 6 These conditions further the policy goals of the United
States in promoting Western-style capitalism in recipient countries,
37
many of them countries in the developing world.
The World Bank and the IMF also tie issues of environmental
protection, sustainability, and workers' rights to loans. 38 By using the
World Bank, the IMF, and its own free trade agreements, the United
States has been, for many years, setting the rules for international

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra subsection IV.B.1.
infra Section V.A.
id.
infra subsection V.B.2.
infra Section LV.B.
infra subsection IV.B.1.
infra Section I.B.
infra Section III.A.
id.
id.
infra text accompanying notes 141-44.
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trade by creating conditions for trade with the United States. 39 This
40
model is now being challenged by China's establishment of the AIIB.
By contrast, China may use the AIIB to issue loans with fewer or no
conditions, which might be more appealing to many recipient
countries.4 1 China holds the view that each nation has the sovereign
right to decide for itself how to conduct its internal affairs and should
not be made subject to intrusive political and economic conditions as a
cost of engaging in international trade. 42 This position stands in direct
contrast to the United States' position of using international loans to
actively promote its policy goals of Western capitalism and political
43
reform in environmental protection and workers' rights.
The AIIB and other future initiatives may challenge the
prevailing view that only nations that comply with the conditions set
forth by the United States can engage in international trade. In other
words, the AIIB might make its loans based on the "Beijing
Consensus," a competing ideological view with the Washington
Consensus that is currently considered to be the standard in the
multilateral financial system. Moreover, the AIIB may represent the
first step in China displacing the United States as the final arbiter of
the rules of international trade. The AIIB is the first important blow
to the United States' dominance over international trade and may
portend that China, not the United States, will write the rules of
international trade in the future.
Third, China may use the AIIB to promote its own policy goals in
the same way that the United States has used the World Bank, the
IMF, and free trade agreements to pursue its policy goals. 44 China's
industrial goals are a cluster of mercantilist policies designed by the
State-Party to foster and strengthen its massive state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). 45 China's SOEs control all important economic
sectors in China, and the State-Party has made it a priority to develop
"national champions," that is, SOEs that can compete with the most
powerful multinational companies in the world. 46 The AIIB may allow
the State-Party to create business opportunities for SOEs in recipient
countries. 47 The stated goal of the AIIB is to make loans to developing

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
See

infra Section III.A.
infra Part IV.
infra subsection TV.B.1.
infra text accompanying notes 149-52; Part III.B.
infra Section I1I.B.
infra Part V.
infra text accompanying note 247.
infra subsection TV.B.2.
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countries for infrastructure projects, 48 such as the building of roads,
dams, power plants, rail transport, and air transport (including
airports).
Many of China's massive SOEs can provide these services under
the auspices of the AIIB. In other words, the AIIB can lend money to
developing countries to pay SOEs from China to build their
infrastructure projects. These projects will help to absorb some of the
excess capacity that these SOEs are currently experiencing, created by
49
years of building and over-building infrastructure projects in China.
From China's perspective, this may seem perfectly sensible; after all,
the United States has been promoting its own policy goals for decades
through the use of the World Bank and the IMF, and, more recently,
through its free trade agreements. Why should China not pursue its
policy goals through the AIIB? This would seem to be a sensible and
practical course of action. How successful China is in using the AIIB as
a policy tool will depend on whether the other members of the AIIB,
such as the United Kingdom, will stand up to and hold China
accountable for international best practices or will allow China to
pursue its industrial policy goals in exchange for economic
50
opportunities from China.
This Article will develop these themes as follows: Part II will
discuss the history of the Bretton Woods institutions, including the
reasons for the formation of the World Bank. and the IMF. Part II will
also discuss the current composition of the World Bank and IMF and
how the United States uses both institutions to advance its policy
goals. This Part will also discuss China's limited role in the World
Bank and IMF and why prospects are dim for China to exercise an
expanded role. Part III will then examine how the United States uses
the World Bank and the IMF to further its own policy interests through
a series of policies called the Washington Consensus and why China
objects to this approach. Part IV will examine how China can challenge
the Washington Consensus by using the AIIB to forge the Beijing
Consensus as a policy tool to further its own policy goals. Part V will
draw some conclusions for the future of international trade, including
the growing divide between the United States and China on
international trade and the growing competition with regard to who
will write the rules for international trade in the twenty-first century.

See AIB Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the purpose
48.
of the AIB is to "improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in
infrastructure and other productive sectors"). Id. at 2 ("[Tjhe establishment of the Bank
as a multilatoral financial institution focused on infrastructure development will help to
mobilize much needed additional resources from inside and outside Asia and to remove
the financing bottlenecks faced by the individual economies in Asia.").
49.
See infra text accompanying note 256.
50.
See infra Part V.
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II. THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND CHINA'S PERCEIVED NEED FOR
THE AIIB

A. The Bretton Woods Institutions
In July 1944, near the end of World War II, the United States
convened a meeting of forty-four nations in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire. 51 The goal of the Bretton Woods Conference, officially
known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, was
to establish the multilateral institutions that would repair the
52
shattered world economy after an immensely destructive world war.
The new multilateral financial institutions were also intended to set
up a framework for international trade and finance in order to prevent
re-occurrence of the disastrous economic policies of the first decades of
the twentieth century that plunged the world into to a second world
53
war only decades after the first.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, after World War I,
many countries erected protectionist trade barriers. 54 "In 1930, the
U.S. Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act," which imposed
tariffs (taxes on imports) "that averaged over 53 percent of the value of
the products imported into the United States ....

[O]ther nations

followed suit [and enacted] similarly draconian tariffs. ' 55 These tariff
barriers were intended to prevent trade and encourage isolationism. 56
As these protectionist barriers arose, "nations viewed [one another]
with mistrust and hostility," 57 and the conflicts that inevitably erupted
contributed to the start of World War I. 5 8 One lesson from this recent
history that the Bretton Woods participants did not want to repeat was
that, when economic conflict exists, military conflict will likely soon
follow. 59

51.
The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE ARCHIVE,
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/palho/time/wwii198681.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2016)
[https:/Hperma.cc/R6NS-Y9DR] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
52.
See id. (outlining the policies adopted at Bretton Woods and explaining the
need for economic cooperation in light of the unsuccessful protectionist policies of the
prior decade).
53.
See id. (explaining that the policies used to combat the Great Depression led
to international instability).
54.
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 18 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW].

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Bretton Woods nations envisioned a tripartite structure of
international economic institutions consisting of an International
Trade Organization (ITO), the World Bank, and the IMF. 60 The ITO
would help to reduce trade barriers and facilitate global trade. 61 The
ITO never came into existence, however, due mainly to opposition by
the U.S. Congress. 6 2 Before the demise of the ITO, the Bretton Woods
members did manage to pass a treaty to be administered by the ITO
called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) (GATT
1947), which helped to jump start world trade by reducing tariffs. 63 The
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1,
1995, can be seen as the final completion of the tripartite system first
envisioned by the Bretton Woods nations, as the WTO plays the role
first envisioned for the ITO, although with far more powers than were
64
contemplated for the ill-fated ITO.
The second and third institutions created by the Bretton Woods
Conference were the World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank was
to make loans first for the reconstruction of Europe, devastated by
World War II, and then to developing countries to alleviate poverty and
assist in economic development. 65 What is now commonly referred to
as the World Bank is technically named the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); 66 the World Bank (or IBRD)
is part of a World Bank Group that consists of a number of banks, each
with a designated role in world lending. 67 The IMF was to facilitate
currency flows (flows of money) across national borders and to ensure

60.
Id.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
63.
The GATT (1947) became a treaty without an administrative organ as the
ITO never came into existence. The GATT (1947) was administered by a skeletal staff in
Geneva until January 1, 1995 when the WTO came into existence and took over the
administration of the GATT, now known as GATT (1994). See id. at 26.
64.
Id. at 28.
See id. at 19 ("The primary mission of the World Bank is to alleviate poverty
65.
by providing loans... [and] grants.").
66.

THE LEVIN INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND WORLD BANK,

GLOBALIZATION 101, 11, http://www.globalizationlOl.org/uploads/File/IMF/imfall.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4DTH-3R8Q] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
67.
The World Bank actually consists of a group of institutions. Within this
group is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which
provides loans for middle-income and poor countries for economic development; "the
International Development Association (IDA) provides loans to the least developed and
poorest countries of the world." The International Finance Corporation (IFC) provides
financing for projects in poor countries that investors might otherwise find too risky.
"The Multilateral Investment Guarantee (MIGA) helps promote FDI in developing
countries by insuring against political risk, such as expropriation, war," and civil
disturbances. The International Center for Investment Disputes (ICSID) provides a
facility for the settlement of investment disputes between foreign investors and the host
country of the investment. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 54, at 19.
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stability in the international financial system by encouraging the free
convertibility of currencies. 68 The IMF was also designed to discourage
the vicious cycle of currency devaluations that occurred prior to World
0
War 11,69 and to assist countries with balance of payment problems. 7
Both the World Bank and the IMF were ultimately designed to
facilitate world trade. 71 After all, global trade is not truly possible if
many nations are too poor or lack the infrastructure to trade, and trade
cannot be conducted if cross-border payments cannot be made
predictably and reliably.
B. Voting Power within the World Bank and the IMF
Both the World Bank and the IMF are funded by subscriptions
(contributions) from their members. 72 Voting shares within both

68.
Id. at 19.
69.
Suppose Country A has reserves of Country B's currency as a result of trade
with Country B. If Country B then unilateral announces a devaluation of its currency by
50 percent, Country A's currency reserves have just lost 50 percent of its value. Country
A may then feel cheated by Country B and hostilities may arise. Id. at 20.
What are some of the balance of payment issues that countries face? Here is
70.
a brief discussion:
Suppose that Country A has purchased a large quantity of imports from Country
B and is due to pay B a sum in B's national currency. Or A has borrowed a loan
from B and must repay B. Due to domestic problems, A may lack sufficient
amounts of foreign exchange reserves (i.e., B's currency) to pay B. For example,
a sudden drop in the price of a key export from A, imprudent domestic fiscal
policies, high levels of external debt, and natural disasters can all contribute to
A's balance of payment problems. Or A may be living beyond its means by buying
goods from B without having earned sufficient foreign currency reserves to pay
B. In this case, A may seek to repay B using A's own currency. If B balks at
accepting A's currency, the IMF will encourage, but cannot require, B to convert
A's currency into B's currency and thus allow A to pay in A's own currency. The
free convertibility of currencies is a key component of international trade; one of
the IMF's roles is to encourage all of its members to allow for free convertibility.
Suppose, however, that due to mismanagement, A does not even have enough of
its own currency to convert into B's currency. At this point, A is faced with
several difficult alternatives. It could reduce its spending, attempt to raise
money by selling government bonds, or print more money. It may find, however,
that reducing spending could lead to hardship, selling its bonds are impossible
because there are no buyers, and printing more money will lead to hyperinflation. These events might trigger a financial and political crisis. The IMF can
provide a loan to A to give it breathing room. Such loans are usually conditioned
on A's agreement to an appropriate IMF program of economic policies to create
fiscal discipline.
Id. at 20.
71.
See id. at 21.
72.
See id. at 19, 21 ('The World Bank is funded primarily by monetary
subscriptions from its 187 member governments and through loans from private banks
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institutions are weighted based on subscriptions. 73 The United States
is the largest subscriber to both the World Bank and the IMF and, as
a result, has the largest voting share in both institutions.7 4 The
membership of the World Bank and the IMF consists of 188 countries,
which includes almost all of the nations of the world. 75 When the World
Bank was founded in 1944, the United States had a 35 percent share
of the voting shares of the World Bank, based on its capital
contributions and overall economic strength. 76 Currently, the United
States has a 17.48 percent voting share in the World Bank 7 7 and has a
16.21 percent voting share in the IMF 7 -- still by far the largest in both
institutions. Additionally, the United States is the only World Bank

that are backed by government bonds issued by its members." Further explaining that
IMF funds "are contributed by members in the form of assigned quotas.").
73.
Id. at 19-20.
74.
See id. at 21 ("The United States continues to wield the most power in these
organizations with a 16.36 percent voting share in the World Bank and 17 percent quota
share in the IMF.").
75.
See Member Countries,THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/enl
about/leadership/members (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.ccfMKR4-SJXY]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) (listing all member countries of the World Bank generally and
listing membership of the IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA, and ICSID).
76.
See STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES, GOVERNANCE OF THE WORLD BANK, REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 4 (2002),
http://www.stephanygj.net/papers/Governance of the WorldBank.Paper_
prepared forDFID.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.ccfMQ85-WEZ9]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) (noting that the United States was given 35 percent of the
World Bank stock when the Bank was formed based on the relative strength of the U.S.
economy).
77.
See World Bank GroupFinances, WORLD BANK GRP., https://finances.
worldbank.org/organization (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/GJ89-G7LT]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) (providing general financial visualizations for the IBRD and
IDA including financial summaries of lending by region). The United States' share
represents its voting share in the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), the arm of the World Bank responsible for making loans for
economic development. See InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development,
WORLD BANK (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/
(archived Sept. 18, 2016)
what-we-do/brief/ibrd [https://perma.cc/83A6-XAHH]
(describing the history of the IBRD as the original World Bank institution). Japan has
the next highest voting percentage of 7.64, less than half of the U.S. share. See World
Bank Group Finances,WORLD BANK GRP., https://finances.worldbank.org/
Shareholder-Equity/Top-8-countries-voting-power/udm3-vzz9 (last visited Sept. 18,
2016) [https://perma.cc/8JUY-BL6Z] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (visualizing voting power
of the top eight countries in the World Bank based on IBRD statements of subscriptions
to capital stock and voting power and listing the United States as having 17.5 percent of
the World Bank's total voting power).
78.
See IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Directors,
INT'L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/
members.aspx [https://perma.cc/RWT8-S54Z] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) [hereinafter IMF
Members' Quotas and Voting Power] (noting that the next highest voting share in the
IMF is held by Germany with a 5.81 voting share).
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shareholder that retains veto power over decisions by the World
79
Bank.
Both the World Bank and the IMF have a similar governing
structure. The World Bank is headed by a President and the IMF is
headed by a Managing Director.8 0 Both institutions have a Board of
Governors consisting of a representative (usually the trade minister)
from each Member Country.8 1 Although the Board of Governors is the
highest governing body in both the World Bank and the IMF, and
assists the President and Managing Director, the governors have
delegated the duties for the day-to-day operations of both institutions
to an Executive Board that assists the heads of their respective
organizations.8 2 As a sister institution, the organization of the IMF
closely tracks that of the World Bank. The IMF has twenty-four
executive directors, five of whom are appointed by the members
holding the largest quotas (currently the United States, Japan,
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom).8 3 The others are elected
by the remaining member countries.8 4 The World Bank recently added

79. See Country at a Glance: United States, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.
org/encountry/unitedstates/overview (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
NVY5-MQU5] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (providing overview of the United States' leading
force in the World Bank).
80.
See Office of the President,WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/
about/president (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/XV99-7PGT] (archived
Sept. 18, 2016) (providing brief overview of the office of the president of the World Bank
and listing Dr. Jim Yong Kim as the 12th president of the World Bank Group); see also
About the IM: Christine Lagarde, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/omdbios/cl.htm [https://perma.cc/3NH9-SKAC]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Lagarde] (providing brief biographic overview of
IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde).
81.
See Organization,WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/enlabout
leadership (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/L4C4-PB7H] (archived Sept. 18,
2016) (noting that all 189 World Bank member countries are represented by the Board
of Governors, "the ultimate policymakers at the World Bank"); see also Governance
Structure, INT'L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/about/
govstruct.htm (lastvisited Sept. 17, 2016) [https:Hlperma.cc/7V9V-S8KJ] (archived Sept.
18, 2016) (noting that the IMF Board of Governors is comprised of one governor and one
alternate governor for each member country).
82.
See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 82 (describing the Board of Governors
as "the highest decision-making body of the IMF' but noting that it "[has delegated most
of its powers to the IMF's Executive Board").
83.
See How the IMF Makes Decisions, INT'L MONETARY FUND (July 27, 2016),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/govern.htm [https://perma.cc/QWC3-EVGD]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) (noting that for all elections prior to October 2016, the five
member countries with the largest quotas each appointed one Executive Director and
the remaining member countries elected the remainder of the Executive Directors).
84.
See id. (stating that for all elections prior to October 2016, the remaining
nineteen Executive Directors were elected by the IMF member countries that did not
hold top-five quota status).
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an additional executive director, so now it has twenty-five executive
directors.85
The executive directors of the World Bank and IMF are on-site
and conduct the day-to-day affairs of both institutions. In the World
Bank, the executive directors meet regularly every week, 8 6 so they are
intimately involved in the workings of the World Bank. The twentyfive executive directors of the World Bank elect the President of the
World Bank, who also serves as Chair of the Board of Directors.8 7 The
twenty-four executive directors of the IMF elect the Managing
88
Director, who also serves as the Chair of the IMF Board of Directors.
The executive directors of both institutions make decisions by
consensus, that is, by the unanimous approval of all directors, although
89
a formal vote is sometimes taken.
Although the executive directors are authorized to elect the heads
of their respective institutions from their entire membership, by
tradition, the executive directors always elect an American to be the
President of the World Bank and a European to be the Managing
Director of the IMF. 90 The current President of the World Bank is Jon
Yong Kim, former President of Dartmouth College, 9 1 and the current
Managing Director of the IMF is Christine Lagarde, former French
Finance Minister.9 2 The Deputy Managing Director of the IMF is
appointed by the U.S. Treasury.9 3 These traditions have been carried

85.
See Board of Directors, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/
about/leadership/directors (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https:H/perma.cc/8MQU-RKKN]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) (the World Bank added one additional executive director to
make a total of twenty-five as of November 2010).
86.
Natalie Lichtenstein, Chief Counsel, AIIB Multilateral Interim Secretariat,
Keynote Address at Harvard Law School (Nov. 15, 2015). The author was in attendance
at this speech and the ensuing conference. Ms. Lichtenstein served as a lawyer for the
World Bank for thirty years at the World Bank in various roles. See Natalie G.
Lichtenstein,JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF INT'L STUD., https://www.sais-jhu.edu/natalielichtenstein (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/KZ62-ZLQF (archived Sept.
18, 2016).
87.
See WORLD BANK, supranote 82.
88.
See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 84 (noting that the Executive Board
appoints for a renewable five year term the Managing Director who also acts as
chairman of the Executive Board).
89.
See id. ("The Board normally makes decisions based on consensus, but
sometimes formal votes are taken.").
90.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 54, at 21.

91.
See About the Office: Current President, WORLD BANK, http://
www.worldbank.org/en/about/president/about-the-officebio (last visited Sept. 17, 2016)
[https:H/perma.cc/6TPQ-VWZH] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
92.
See Lagarde, supra note 81.
See Joshua E. Keating, Why is the IMF Chief Always a European?, FOREIGN
93.
POL'Y (May 18, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/201 1/05/18/why-is-the-imf-chief-always-aeuropean/ [https://perma.cc/N8VZ-YDHS] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (explaining that
informal agreements dictate that the U.S. Treasury appoints the IMF deputy managing
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out since 1944 and, although there have been calls for a change in this
structure, the tradition has continued unimpeded for the last seventy
years. 94 This arrangement is a "gentleman's agreement" ensconced by
long tradition and maintained by the United States and a small group
of western European nations and Japan 95-one of the United States'
closest allies outside of the western world.
Adding to the perception that the World Bank and the IMF are
dominated by the United States, the headquarters of both the World
Bank and the IMF are located in Washington, D.C. 96 At one time, both
were located in the same building. 97 Today, they are located in
buildings on the opposite sides of the same street. 98 Both the World
Bank and the IMF also work closely with the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury.99

Adding to China's frustrations in international finance was the
fact that Japan dominates the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an
affiliate of the World Bank located in Manila, the capital of the
Philippines. 0 0 By tradition, the President of the ADB is Japanese 11
and Japan holds more than twice (12.80 percent) the voting power in
the ADB compared to China (5.477 percent),1 02 although China has the

director and that the directors are always European despite U.S. control over their
selection).
94.
The days of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" that an American should always
be the head of the World Bank and a European chief of the IMF has drawn increasing
criticism from developing countries and may be coming to a close, but the day has not
yet arrived. See New Head of IMF Likely to be European, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/O6/29lbusiness/worldbusiness/29iht-imf.4.6419485.
html?_ r-0 [https://perma.cc/VG8K-VKG6] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (quoting an IMF
official as stating that in reference to the IMF that "[ilt
will be important for the
credibility of that reform process that the selection process is opened up to candidates
other than a European").
95.
See id. (discussing the origins of the "gentlemen's agreement"). Another
tradition favors Japan since the head of the Asian Development Bank is also Japanese.
Perhaps this too is part of the "gentleman's agreement." See infra note 101.
96.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 54, at 21.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
See Contacts, ASIAN DEV. BANK, http://www.adb.orglcontacts/main (last
visited Sept. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/38JH-T9P5] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (providing
a list of all ADB offices).
101.
See Stephen Howes et al., Asian Development Bank Defies G20, EAST ASIA
FORUM (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/27/asian-developmentbank-defies-g20/ [https://perma.cc/N3ZU-EGZ2] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) ("ADB
presidents - eight of them since the Bank's founding in 1966 - have always been
nominated by Japan and rubber-stamped by everybody else.").
102.
See Annual Report 2014: Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power, ASIAN
DEV. BANK (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutionaldocument/158032/oi-appendixl.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.ccfWL9M-
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larger economy. The United States holds a 12.752 percent voting share
in the ADB, 1 03 just a fraction below Japan's share. Together, Japan
and the United States, close allies, dominate ADB lending in Asia.
Given all of these entrenched traditions, meant to maintain the
power status quo, China might feel like an outsider or, at best, a minor
player in both Bretton Woods institutions. China currently has a 6.09
percent voting share in the IMF 10 4 and a 4.61 percent voting share in
the World Bank. 10 5 In 2010, a proposal was made in the IMF to reform
voting rights in order to give developing countries greater voting power
and to reduce the dominance of western European nations on the Board
of Directors.10 6 The 2010 reforms would have made China the IMF's
third largest member.10 7 However, the U.S. Congress rejected this
reform, leading to criticism by the Chief of the IMF, China, and other
IMF emerging market countries.' 0 8 Even if the U.S. Congress had
approved the reforms, China would still have had far less power in the
IMF than the United States.109 China cannot be blind to the political
reality that the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB will continue to be
dominated by the United States, working in close cooperation with a
few western European allies and Japan to control international finance
and trade.
C. China'sDecision to Establish the AIIB
China's minor role in both Bretton Woods institutions is no doubt
one impetus for establishing the AIIB. As the world's second largest
economy, China has only a minor role in the world's two most

3BEV] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (listing the capital stock and voting power for all
members of the Asian Development Bank and stating that Japan holds 12.840 percent
voting power and China holds 5.477 percent).
See id. (stating that the United States holds 12.752 percent voting power in
103.
the Asian Development Bank).
IMFMembers' Quotas and Voting Power, supra note 79.
104.
105.
THE WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT SUBSCRIPTIONS AND VOTING POWER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES 1 (2016),

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/2780271215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BB7-47HP] (archived
Sept. 18, 2016).
106.
See China Urges IMF to Give More Power to Emerging Markets, REUTERS
(Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-imf-idUSBREAOE1PT2014
0115 [https:/perma.cc/74GM-BKPF] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (noting that the U.S.
Congress refused to fund measures that give China more voting power in the IMF).
107.
See id. (noting that the reforms would have made China the third-largest
IMF member and would have reduced western Europe's control of the IMF board).
108.
See id. (noting the failure of the U.S. Congress' to include the IMF funding
in a spending bill approved in January 2014).
See id. (stating that the reforms would have made China the third-largest
109.
IMF member and that the United States is the largest IMF member).
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important multilateral financial institutions. Long tradition, the
unwillingness of the United States to cede power, and the general
negative sentiment towards China in the U.S. Congress'1 0 might have
convinced China that gaining any real clout in the World Bank and
IMF was a losing battle. Instead of fighting a battle for greater power
in the World Bank and IMF that it could not win, China decided to set
up its own bank where it would play the leading role. On October 24,
2014, China President Xi Jinping signed an agreement to establish the
AIIB with twenty-one Asian nations."'
A second reason for establishing the AIIB is the urgent need for
infrastructure development in Asia. Estimates are that Asia will need
over $8 trillion per year for the next ten years in infrastructure
development. 112 The World Bank currently has only $252 billion of

110.
See Robert Sutter, Congress' Weak China Hand, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/congress-weak-china-hand/ [https://perma.cc/DE28RDRA] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (noting "the upswing in congressional criticism of
China's policies").
111.
See Twenty One Asian Sign MOU Establishing Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, XINHUANET (Oct. 24, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
business/2014-10/24/c_133740149.htm [https://perma.cc/PX25-J68C] (archived Sept. 18,
2016) (listing the twenty-one founding signatories: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia,
China, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan and
Vietnam, and mentioning that President Xi met with representatives from each of the
signing nations). China is also a founding member of the New Development Bank (NDB)
consisting of the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa). The NDB, established in July 2015, is also intended to lending money for
infrastructure projects to developing countries. The formation of the NBD, however, has
been marred by years of distrust among its members. Among to the media, the NBD is
not even a real bank. It has an initial capital of $50 billion, most of it contributed by
China. Once these funds are used up, then the other members must contribute their
share of capital but it is not clear that the other BRICS countries, all beset by financial
difficulties, will even be able to contribute their shares. The NDB is viewed with
suspicion by its own members, the other BRICS countries, due to China's outsize
influence and matters of governance could be contentious. For these reasons, it is
doubtful that the NDB will be a major player in international lending, unlike the AIIB
in which no one seems to question China's dominance. See NBD: A Bank with a Question
Mark, DUETSCHE WELLE (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/ndb-a-bank-with-aquestion-mark/a-19172152 [https://perma.cc/6FAF-54LQ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016)
(proposing that whether the NDB will be viewed as a "real bank" in which investors have
confidence will depend of the success of its first projects and noting the concern of critics
that a bank established by the BRICs counties will be less reliable in upholding labor
and social standards than is the World Bank or the IMF).
112.
See W4ho Will Pay for Asia's $8 Trillion Infrastructure Gap?, ASIAN DEV.
BANK (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.adb.org/news/infographics/who-will-pay-asias-8trillion-infrastructure-gap [https:Ilperma.cc/3JAF-KZRZ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016)
(describing Asia's $8 trillion infrastructure gap and considering whether the private
sector should play a larger role in closing the gap through investment and financing
instruments).
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available capital-far short of what is needed. The AIIB has a current
authorized capital fund of $100 billion,11 3 but China has $3.5 trillion
in capital reserves,1 1 4 which could be used to increase the capital of the
AIIB at some point in the future. Infrastructure projects approved by
the World Bank are also conditioned on a set of policies 11 5 that some
Asian countries find onerous; 1 6 the AIIB holds out the promise of less
red tape and fewer conditions in lending, which might expedite the
11 7
loans.
Third, the United States seems to needlessly antagonize China
over the AIIB, which only strengthens China's resolve to establish the
AIIB with a broad membership. Not only did the United States block
attempts to give China more power in the IMF, but, as soon as China
formally announced the AIIB, the United States also launched a
campaign to dissuade its allies from joining the AIIB. The United
States claimed that the AIIB would not follow best practices in
international lending because China would fail to live up to the
environmental, human rights, and other governance standards that
are essential for developing countries.1 1 8 Certainly, the United States
could decide for itself that it would not join the AIIB, but it also did not
want any of its allies to joinn1 --a move that seemed petulant and
cynical to Beijing. 120 To counter the U.S. campaign, China sent Jin
Liqun, a former finance minister 121 and the presumptive new head of
the AIIB, 122 to Washington, D.C. in an attempt to persuade U.S.
officials that China would indeed adopt the best practices of nations in
international lending. The United States, however, remained skeptical
of China's real intentions. An official of the National Security Council
refused to believe Mr. Jin's assurances and stated, "I am not going the

AJIB Articles of Agreement, supranote 2, at art. 4(1).
113.
$4 Trillion Peak in FX Hoard Frees PBOC Hands: Economy, BLOOMBERG
114.
(Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-11/-4-trillion-peak-forchina- s -stockpile -of-foreign-currency- may-free -pboc- s-hands [https://perma.ccW3WKLSZJ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
See infra Section III.A.
115.
116.
See infra subsection IV.B.1.
See id.
117.
See Perlez, supranote 7 (explaining that the United States fears China will
118.
use the AIIB to "set the global economic agenda on its own terms, forgoing the
environmental protections, human rights, anticorruption measures and other
governance standards" that the United States has promoted in the past).
See Bird, supra note 8 (suggesting that the United States has been isolated
119.
by allies unexpectedly joining the AIIB).
120.
See infra text accompanying note 137.
121.
See AlIB Articles of Agreement, supranote 2 (describing the election of Liquin
as the first president of the AIIB).
See Magnier, supra note 5 (stating that former vice finance minister Jin
122.
Liquin was chosen in August 2015 by member shareholders as AIIB president-elect).
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buy the cake you have cooked." 123 Undaunted, Mr. Jin replied, 'You
124
are always welcome into the kitchen to help with the baking."
Unconvinced by Mr. Jin's assurances, the United States continued
to press its closest allies, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Germany, several other Western powers in Europe, and important
allies in the Pacific, including Australia and South Korea, to shun the
AIIB. The goal of the United States was to diminish the status of the
AIIB, limiting it to the role of a minor regional bank with a small
membership so that it would pose no threat to the World Bank and the
IMF. 125 Despite the entreaties by the United States, dozens of U.S.
allies, including all of the Western European powers courted by the
United States, joined the AIIB.
The case of Britain is illuminating. Britain is the United States'
closest ally (these ties were cemented when Roosevelt and Churchill
fought together to defeat Nazi Germany and its Axis allies) and will
generally stand with the United States on any decision of this
magnitude. Yet even Britain balked. The timing was fortuitous
because relations between Britain and China had been icy since British
Prime Minister David Cameron met with the exiled Dai Lama in
2012,126 and Britain was eager to get back in China's good graces.
Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer (a position similar to the U.S.
Treasury Secretary) wanted London to become a prime center for the
trading in Chinese currency, the Renminbi (RMB or "people's currency"
in English), and felt that investment inflows from China to Britain
were essential to the nation's health. 127 Keeping the negotiations
secret, Britain gave Washington twenty-four hours' notice when it

123.
The statement was made by Evan S. Medeiros, the council's senior adviser
on China. Perlez, supra note 7.
124.
Id.
125.
See Jane Perlez, U.S. Opposing China's Answer to World Bank, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-plan-for-regionaldevelopment-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html?ref=world&_r=0. [https:/Iperma.ccl
YLS2-GJDZ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (noting that the United States tried to dissuade
South Korea and Australia from joining A1IB to "ensure membership in the bank would
be limited to smaller countries, depriving it of the prestige and respectability the Chinese
seek").
126.
See Andrew Woodcock, David Cameron 'Must Apologise' for Meeting Dalai
Lama to Restore Diplomatic Relations with China, Bus. INSIDER (May 7, 2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/us -allies-joining-asian-infrastructure-investmentbank-aiib-embarrassment-2015-3?r=UK&IR=T [https://perma.cc/JAS3-KYEB]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) (describing China's anger over Cameron's meeting with the
Dalai Lama and "that the meeting had 'undermined' UK-China relations"). The Dalai
Lama is the spiritual leader of Tibet who fled into exile decades ago to avoid Chinese
rule over Tibet, which continues to be an area of contested sovereignty. For a further
discussion of Tibet, see infra Section III. B.
127.
Perlez, supra note 7.
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decided to join the AIIB. 128 Washington considered this to be a major
affront 129 and the U.S. press ridiculed the "craven desperation with
which Britain has sought to ingratiate itself with China,"'130 even
suggesting that Britain has transformed itself from an "American
poodle" into a "Chinese lapdog."'131 A few months later, President Xi
rewarded Britain in a four-day state visit that resulted in commercial
deals worth $40 billion pounds ($60 billion dollars) and a Chinese
investment stake in the British nuclear industry. 132 Britain's example
opened the floodgates for other traditional U.S. allies to join, including
France, Germany, Italy, Australia, and South Korea. Altogether fiftyseven nations, including Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa, have
joined the AIIB. 133 Far from being a small regional bank with a limited
membership, the AIIB boasts most of the major economic powers of the
world among its members.
The U.S. media has labeled the United States' handling of the
AIIB as a diplomatic disaster and a humiliation for the Obama
administration. 134 Delighted by the U.S. failure, the Chinese statecontrolled media gloated: "Welcome Germany! Welcome France!
Welcome Italy!"135 Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency,
continued, saying that "[d]espite a petulant and cynical Washington,"
more and more major countries are joining the AIIB. 136 "[H]olding sour
1 37
grapes over the AIIB makes America look isolated and hypocritical."'
China's official press agency finished with a derisive jab aimed at the
138
United States: "So Washington, what are you waiting for?"'

128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
See American poodle to Chinese lapdog?, supra note 23 (noting Britain's
eagerness to curry favor with China and describing British Prime Minister David
Cameron's visit to China in December 2013 as a "tour of atonement, to make up for the
offense... Cameron had given China by meeting the Dalai Lama... the previous year").
131.
See id.
132.
China's Xi Seals Nuclear Power Deal as Part of $62 Billion Splurge in
Britain, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-china-britainidUSKCNOSFOQ720151021 [https://perma.cc/E5L9-DGMF] (archived Oct. 3, 2016).
133.
See 50 Countries Sign the Articles of Agreement for the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, supra note 9.
134.
David R. Sands, Diplomatic Disaster: Obama Humiliated by Allies' Rush to
Join China's New Bank, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2015/mar/18/obama-humiliated-as-allies-jioin-chinas-asian-infra?page=all
[https://perma.cc/JE7G-CKTF] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
135.
Tian Dongdong, Commentary: Washington, What Are You Waiting For?,
XINHUANET (Mar. 18, 2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/18/
c_134076605.htm [https://perma.cc/4Q9P-6CVQ] (archived Sept. 18,2016).
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
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AND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

A. The Washington Consensus and the Doctrine of Conditionality
Not only does China object to what appears to be its permanent,
minor role in the World Bank and IMF, but China also objects to how
both institutions are being used to further the policy goals of the
United States and its allies. Loans from the World Bank and the IMF
are conditioned on the recipient accepting a list of fiscal and policy
demands that are known as the Washington Consensus. These policies
are the following:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
"
*
*
*

Fiscal discipline (limits on government spending);
Redirection of public expenditures towards education, health,
and infrastructure;
Tax reform (broadening the tax base and reduction in overall
taxes);
Market-determined interest rates (no government set interest
rates on borrowed money);
Competitive exchange rates (no exchange rates pegged to a
hard currency such as the U.S. dollar);
Trade liberalization (reduction or elimination of tariffs and
quotas on imports);
Openness to foreign direct investment;
Privatization of state-owned enterprises;
Deregulation;
Legal security for property rights, including intellectual
property rights; and
13 9
Reduced roles for the state.

Additional policies promoted by the World Bank are
environmental sustainability, 140 workers' rights (that is, the four core
labor standards of (1) freedom of workers to engage in collective
bargaining, (2) prohibitions against child labor and (3) slave labor, and
(4) elimination of discrimination in employment1 41 ), and non-

139.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 54, at 21-22.
140.
See Goal 7 Ensure Environment Sustainability by 2015, WORLD BANK,
http://www.worldbank.org/mdgs/environment.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/AAF2-TJHJ] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (noting that part of the World
Bank Environmental Sustainability Strategy is improving "sustainable management of
natural resources" and increasing "access to low-emission, climate-smart transport,
energy, [and] agriculture").
141.
See The World Bank, Core Labor Standards and the World Bank, LABOR
MARKETS (July 2000), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/
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corruption in government. 142 The United States has recently indicated
that all future U.S. free trade agreements with its trading partners will
contain provisions linking trade to the environment and workers'
rights. 143 One observer, Ian Bremmer, President of the Eurasia Group,
notes that, "[flor decades the [United States] has used its authority in
the World Bank and IMF... to guide developing countries toward
144
Western values."
Critics of the Washington Consensus are legion. One of the most
prominent is Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist of the World Bank from
1997-2000 and a winner of the Nobel Prize in economics. Stiglitz
argues that these conditions are too rigidly and unthinkingly applied
to countries regardless of their individual characteristics. 145 He thinks
these conditions-often referred to as a whole as "conditionality"-are
going far beyond the typical requirements that banks impose on
borrowers to ensure that the money is paid back; 146 rather, Stiglitz
claims that these conditions are so forceful that they should be seen a
policy tool to reshape the governance of nations, often putting recipient
nations in the humiliating position of either choosing to cave in or
forgoing the money. 147 These polices are designed to promote a system
based on the Washington Consensus, laden with its Western emphasis
on developing countries without regard to the social effects-an

EXTSOCJALPROTECTION/EXTLMI0,,contentMDK:20310132-menuPK:390633-page
PK: 148956-piPK:216618-theSitePK:390615-isCURL:Y,00.html [https://perma.cc/
E4JF-W3GB] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) (describing how the World Bank seeks to achieve
an atmosphere that is conducive to achieving core labor standards).
142.
The World Bank Group has a strategic plan for curbing corruption. See
generally STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE: TACKLING CORRUPTION, THE WORLD BANK
GROUP'S UPDATED STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN (Mar. 16,
2012),

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/28
5741-1326816182754/GACStrategylmplementationPlan.pdf [https:Hperma.cc/2SYJNXY6] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) [hereinafter ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY].
143.
See infra text accompanying note 162.
144.
Ian Bremmer, What Does the AIIB Mean for the U.S.?, WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/04/what-does-the-aiibmean -for-the -us/?utm content=buffer46e36&utm medium=social&utm-source=
twitter.com&utm-campaign=buffer [https://perma.cc/3UT3-YPSD] (archived Sept. 18,
2016).
145.

See JOSEPH P. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 16 (2002)

("[T]he economic policies that evolved into the Washington Consensus and were
introduced into developing countries were not appropriate for countries in the early
stages of development or early stages of transition."). This theme of uncompromising
rigidity and arrogance on the part of the IMF and the Work Bank underlies the entirely
of Chapter One, 'The Promise of Global Institutions," of Stiglitz's book. Id. at 3-22.
146.
See id. at 44.
147.
See id. at 40-41 (describing how the managing director forced the humiliated
president of Indonesia to turn over economic sovereignty of his country as a condition of
receiving a loan from the IMF).
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invasion of sovereignty. 148 Moreover, some of these reforms-such as
privatization, transparency, and non-corruption in governmentmight even lead to the toppling of the more corrupt and unstable
regimes in developing countries, resulting in wholesale political and
regime change. 149 These goals are far beyond the typical banker's much
more modest goals, to ensure the repayment of money with interest; 50
they are political ends that suit the ambitious global agenda of the
United States and some of its allies. In other words, the World Bank
and IMF are not acting like banks but rather like instruments of
political and economic reform, in accordance with an agenda set by the
United States and its close allies.
This criticism of the World Bank and IMF, as expressed by
Stiglitz, is widely known, but China has a deeper concern about the
Washington Consensus. China sees the Washington Consensus as
posing a political threat to China's long-term national and global
interests. The Washington Consensus and the doctrine of
conditionality espouse a view that world trade can be conditioned on a
set of intrusive Western-style policies that are imposed by more
powerful nations onto less powerful nations as the cost of doing
business. The cost of doing business with the World Bank and the IMF
is a commitment to economic and policy reform in accordance with the
rules set forth by the United States and its allies. China rejects this
approach as an illegitimate interference with the borrower nation's
1 1
sovereign right to conduct its own internal affairs as it wishes. 5
In contrast to the doctrine of conditionality embodied in the
Washington Consensus, China follows a doctrine of non-interference,
that is, China believes that the political characteristics of a borrower
nation, or any nation with which it conducts business, is of no concern
to anyone but that nation itself. 152 This doctrine of non-interference is
one reason why China has been subject to criticism for doing business
with rogue states such as Sudan, which has little regard for human

148.
See id. at 40-41, 44-45 (explaining how the rigid conditions can undermine
economic development with the nations subject to those conditions).
See id. at 20, 47, 52 (describing riots that erupted in countries like Indonesia,
149.
Morocco, and Thailand following IMF intervention as a result of reduced assistance for
unattained conditions).
150.
Id. at 44.
151.
See Principlesof China's foreign Policy, ASIA FOR EDUCATORS (2009) (citing
ANDREW J. NATHAN & ROBERT S. ROSS, THE GREAT WALL AND THE EMPTY FORTRESS:
CHINA'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY (1997)), http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special

china_1950_forpol principles.htm [https://perma.cc/S269-6RLU] (archived Sept. 18,
2016) (explaining that a core idea of China's foreign policy is the "uninfringeable
sovereignty of all states large and small").
152.

Id.
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rights, 153 and Iran, which has a regime objectionable to western
countries because of its sponsorship of terrorism and its desire to
acquire nuclear weapons.154 Despite sweeping economic sanctions
imposed by the United States and other world powers on Iran, China
invested heavily in Iran and, now that the sanctions have been lifted,
China is far ahead of the West in investment projects. 155 From China's
perspective, each nation has a right to determine for itself how it views
the issue of human rights and other internal policies (e.g., selfarmament), and it is not for China--or the United States-to attempt
to use trade as a tool to coerce a nation to change its own policies.
B. China'sDoctrine of Non-Interference
China's doctrine of non-interference is fundamentally at odds with
the doctrine of conditionality that underlies the Washington
Consensus and a great deal of U.S. trade policy. Outside of its work in
the Work Bank and the IMF, the United States now includes
provisions relating to environmental sustainability, transparency, and
workers' rights in all of its free trade agreements. The U.S. practice of
including provisions related to the environment and labor began with
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered
into effect in 1994.156 Along with the main NAFTA agreement, the
parties also entered into two side agreements: the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which aims to improve conditions for
workers, 157 and the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, which provides for obligations to enforce environmental

153.
Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses InternationalTrade to Promote its View
of Human Rights, 45 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 681, 681 n.1 (2013) [hereinafter Chow,
How China Uses InternationalTradel.
154.
See Patrick Clawson, U.S. Sanctions, THE IRANIAN PRIMER (Aug. 2010),
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/us-sanctions [https:Ilperma.cc/65U3-AL7C]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) (discussing how the past five U.S. administrations responded
to Iran with sanctions).
155.
See Thomas Erdbrink, China Deepens its Footprint in Iran After Lifting of
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/25/world/
middleeast/china-deepens-its-footprint-in-iran-after-lifting-of-sanctions.html?r=0
[https://perma.cc/NR7N-S2UB] (archived Oct. 2, 2016) (noting a European diplomat's
statement that "[w]here we had to stand on the sidelines, the Chinese have been filling
the void. ... [t]hey are way ahead of all of us").
156.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/northamerican-free-trade-agreement-nafta/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
A8PY-YADMI (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
157.
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Sept. 14,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993), http://www.labour.gc.ca/eng/relations/international
agreements/naalc.shtml [https://perma.cc/8Z28-JVA2] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).

20.161

WHY CHINA ESTABLISHED THE ASIA INFRASTRUCTURE BANK

1281

protection standards. 158 Subsequently, in 2011, Congress approved the
U.S. South Korean Free Trade Agreement (known as KORUS).
KORUS includes a reciprocal obligation to enforce domestic
environmental laws, as well as obligations under the seven covered
multilateral environmental agreements. 159 KORUS also includes a
reciprocal obligation to adopt and enforce the basic rights of workers,
as contained in the 1998 International Labor Organization Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 160 The current 2012
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), drafted by the U.S.
Department of State, which serves as a template for all future U.S.
BITs with its trading partners, also includes provisions related to
16
transparency, the environment, and labor. '
Why would China object to policies that tie trade obligations to
protection of the environment? There is, of course, the issue of national
sovereignty alluded to above. China believes that policies related to the
balance between industrial development and protection of the
environment are issues that each nation needs to decide for itself.162
Beyond this ideological point, however, is the political reality that
China continues to conduct its own industrial development using
means that are harmful to the environment, such as using coalpowered factories-a source of "dirty fuel" that causes significant air
pollution. 163 "China is [also] the biggest [producer] of greenhouse gases
in the world and the main driver of climate change. '164 According to
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
climate change could lead to serious, permanent, and dangerous

158.
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Can. -Mex.-U.S.,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 J.L.M. 1480 (1993), http://www.cec.org/about-us/NAAEC
[https://perma.ccfM8QJ-W752] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
159.
Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Korea, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 20.2, 20.3.1, Jun. 30, 2007, https:/fustr.gov/sites/
default/files/uploads/agreements/ftalkorus/asset upload file852_12719.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JYN9-RV96] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
160.
Id. at art. 19.2.
161.
2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY arts. 11-13, (2012),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6F9-FZEX]
(archived Sept. 18, 2016).
162.
The preamble of China's Constitution enshrines the basic goal of
modernization and industrialization of science, agriculture, industry, and technology as
a sacred goal of the new nation. See XIANFA pmbl. 3 (1982) (China), http://
en.people.cn/constitutionlconstitution.html [https://perma.cc/6FHB-SH4F] (archived
Sept. 18, 2016).
163.
See Edward Wong, Glut of Coal Powered Plants Casts Doubt on China's
Energy Priorities,N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/
[https:/perma.cc/J3G7-7FPX]
world/asia/china-coal-power-energy-policy.html?_r=0
(archived Oct. 2, 2016) (calling into question China's commitment to renewable energy
given the continuing building of "dirty fuel" coal powered plants).
164.
Id.
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changes to the Earth's environment. 165 If the World Bank, the IMF,
and the United States are able to create an expectation that
international financial obligations and international trade must be tied
to the enforcement of environmental standards, China could find itself
bound to make legal commitments to the environment in its
transactions with the World Bank, the IMF, or with international trade
partners.
It should be emphasized that China does not object to
environmental protection-to the contrary, it is a national priority1 66but China does object to the notion that environmental protection
should be a condition of conducting trade with the United States, and
objects to the notion that multilateral financial institutions dominated
by the United States should be dictating the terms of that
environmental protection as the cost of obtaining a loan. Each nation
should be able to decide, as a matter of sovereign right, how to deal
with environmental protection issues on its own. Such a decision might
include joining multilateral environmental treaties that create
international obligations, but that too involves a voluntary decision to
join and differs from being forced to accept environmental obligations
as a cost of doing business.
Even more important and sensitive to China is the issue of
multilateral financial institutions and the United States dictating the
protection of workers' rights as a condition of doing business. Workers'
rights are closely related to human rights and China insists that each
nation has the sovereign right to decide for itself how to protect human
rights. 167 Furthermore, China believes that human rights are not
absolute and universal, but are derivative from the state; 168 human
rights are relative and need to be determined in accordance with a
country's economic and political stage of development.169 Perhaps the
most important corollary to China's basic view on human rights is the
principle that the sovereign has the right to use force, including deadly
force, against its own citizens when the sovereign finds that it is under

165.

See The Consequences of Climate Change, NAT'L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE

ADMIN., http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/

E7AQ-5D53] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
166.
Article 4 of the PRC Environmental Protection Law states that "[t]he plans
for environmental protection formulated by the state must be incorporated into the
national economic and social development plans." Huanjing Baohu Fa (fftAw#s)
[Environmental Protection Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015), art. 4, http://www.china.org.cn/english/
environment/34356.htm [https://perma.cc/H3BX-FEPW] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
167.
Chow, How China Uses InternationalTrade, supra note 154, at 721.
168.
Id. at 689-96, 721.
169.
Id. at 721.
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threat. 170 This is not an abstract debate for China, but a core national
security interest and a core issue of sovereignty.171
Unlike the United States, China has significant areas of contested
sovereignty involving populations in the tens of millions of people and
active uprisings in some of these areas. 172 Xinjiang Autonomous
Province, a region in northwestern China with a population of over 21
million, is an area subject to frequent incidents of political unrest. 173
Xinjiang is home to the Uyghurs, an ethnic minority of Turkish origin
and Muslim faith. 174 Many Uyghurs feel mistreated by the Chinese
ethnic majority (the Han) and violent clashes resulting in many deaths
have erupted. 175 The State-Party considers the Ugyhur Independence
Movement to be a separatist movement and the attacks on the Han
majority instigated by Uyghurs to be terrorist acts that should be
176
suppressed with merciless force.
Another area of contention is the Xizang Province, also known as
Tibet, a territory of 3 million people in southwestern China. 177 Both
the Tibetans, an ethnic minority with a population of about 3 million
people, and the Uyghurs, have their own languages but are subject to
compulsory education in Chinese, 178 leading many to believe that
China would like to erase their languages and their cultures. 179 The
Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader, fled from Tibet and Chinese rule
into exile many decades ago.' 80 To China's exasperation, the Dalai

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 695-96.
See id. at 696.
Id.
See id. at 701-02.
Id.
See AFP, 450 Killed in China's Xinjiang last year, mostly Uighurs: Group,

DAILY MAIL (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uklwires/afp/article-2978812/450-

killed- Chinas-Xinjiang-year-Uighurs-group.html [https://perma.cc/4CLM-383G]
(archived Oct. 2, 2016) (describing deaths as result of "excessive force" against acts
described by China as acts of "terrorism" and blamed on "separatists") (emphasis in
original).
176.
Chow, How China Uses InternationalTrade, supranote 154, at 701-02.
177.
Id. at 700.
178.
See Tongue-Tied, ECONOMIST (July 2015), http://www.economist.comlnews/
china/21656216-teaching-uighur-children-mandarin-will-not-bring-stability-xinjiangtongue-tied [https://perma.cc/SQ3A-UL2S] (archived Sept. 18, 2016); cf. Saransh Sehgal,
Mandarin Education Plan Riles Tibetans, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Nov.

4,

2010),

[https://perma.cc/8NTB-S425]
http://atimes.com/atimes/China/LK04Ad02.html
(archived Sept. 18, 2016) (explaining "[t]he Chinese government's plan to introduce
Mandarin as the language of education in Tibetan schools" in late 2010).
Sehgal, supra note 179.
179.
180.
The Dalai Lama fled Tibet to India on March 31, 1959 in the face of China's
suppression of a national uprising. March 31: 1959 Dalai Lama Begins Exile, THIS DAY
IN HISTORY (2010), http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/dalai-lama-begins-exile
[https://perma.cc/59X8-KCR4] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
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Lama has since become an international celebrity and icon whose
reception by foreign nations (such the United Kingdom)1 81 always
provokes a furious response by China.
Inflicting the most grievous wound of all to China is Taiwan, an
island off the eastern coast of China with a population of 23.5 million
people 8 2 who share the same ethnic origin as the majority of people on
Mainland China.183 Taiwan serves as the last painful reminder of the
long period of China's weakness and domination by foreign powers that
lasted for 150 years, until the middle of the twentieth century.184 For
fifty years, until the end of World War II, China ceded sovereignty over
Taiwan to Japan as a spoil of war. 185 At the end of World War II, China
was ravaged by a brutal civil war between the Nationalists headed by
Chiang Kai-shek, with the strong backing of the United States, and the
Communists, led by Mao Zedong.1 8 6 For a brief period (from about
1927-1948), Chiang had a tenuous hold on the leadership of China
after having had established a new government, the Republic of China
in 1927.187 Despite having overwhelming advantages in troops and
U.S.-provided military equipment, however, Chiang lost to Mao and
fled to the island of Taiwan where he installed the seat of government
for the Republic of China.188 Implacable enemies to the end, Mao and
Chiang vowed to destroy the other.' 8 9 Without the intervention of the
Korean War and the protection of the United States, it is likely that
190
Taiwan would have long ago returned to Chinese sovereignty.
Although relations between China and Taiwan have improved in
recent years, the separation of Taiwan from the motherland, and the
U.S. role in protecting Taiwan, continue to be deeply painful for the
Party.' 91 A mark of the depth of China's pain is its vow to reunite
Taiwan with the mainland by force if necessary. 192 China has also

181.
The Dalai Lama's visit to the United Kingdom sparked a frigid response from
China and the thawing of relations was one reason why the United Kingdom choose to
join the AIIB. See Perlez, supra note 7.
182.
Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook East and Southeast Asia:
Taiwan, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
tw.html [https://perma.cc/876W-EMMT] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
183.
Chow, How China Uses InternationalTrade, supra note 154, at 697.
184.

See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 22, at 7-9.

185.

Taiwan Provincial Administration Information Hall, Administration of

Taiwan in Recent Centuries, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO TAIWAN'S HISTORY & CULTURE,

http://subtpg.tpg.gov.tw/Eng2/history/history-e-2_3.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/9N88-96TM] (archived Sept. 18, 2016).
186.
See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supranote 22, at 12.
187.
Id. at 10-12.
188.
Id. at 12.
189.
Id.
190.
Chow, How China Uses InternationalTrade, supra note 154, at 698.
191.
See id. at 697.
192.
See id. at 700.
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repeatedly insisted that the issue of Taiwan reunification is an internal
issue and not subject to external interference. 193 No doubt a military
conflict in the Taiwan Straits could result in a huge cost in human
lives. China's insistence that it has the right to use force to reunify
Taiwan with the mainland is a core issue of sovereignty for China on
19 4
which there can be no compromise.
China's insistence that it has the right to use force against its own
citizens is one major reason why China objects to the Western view of
human rights promoted by the United States and other Western
nations. The U.S. view of human rights as universal and above the
state allows human rights to serve as a shield against the use of
arbitrary power by the State. 195 Human rights can also create a right
of the people to self-determination-a view that bolsters Xinjiang,
Tibet, and Taiwan's claims for independence and self-rule.
Aside from workers' rights, human rights, and the environment,
there are other policies in the Washington Consensus that are
inconsistent with China's policies. For example, the privatization of
state-owned enterprises runs directly counter to China's insistence
that the state-owned enterprise must be the centerpiece of the
economy. 9 6 While there are yet other policies of the Washington
Consensus that conflict with China's own policies, the merit of each
policy is less important than China's fundamental objection to the
overall approach of the United States and its allies in using the Bretton
Woods institutions as policy tools to impose Western political and
economic values on countries as a condition of doing business. By
contrast, China's doctrine of non-interference supports its core view
that the state has the right to use force against its own citizens when
the state is threatened. With the establishment of the AIIB, China now
has a multilateral financial institution that espouses China's own
doctrine of non-interference to serve as a counterweight to
Washington's conditionality approach, as embodied in the World Bank
and the IMF. Perhaps China's doctrine of non-interference will soon
become known as the "Beijing Consensus."

193.
Id.
194.
See China Won't Renounce Use of Force in Taiwan; It Urges U.S. to Promote
Peaceful Reunification, DESERT NEWS (Feb. 29, 2000), http://beta.deseretnews.com/
article/746400/China-wont-renounce-use-of-force-in-Taiwan.html?pg=all
[https://perma.cc/5XST-54HH] (archived Sept. 18, 2016) ("China's defense minister told
the commander of U.S. Pacific forces Tuesday that Beijing would never relinquish its
right to use military force to recover the island" of Taiwan.").
195.
See Chow, How China Uses InternationalTrade, supranote 154, at 688-89.
196.
See infra Section IV.B.
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IV. THE AIIB AS A POLICY TOOL FOR CHINA

A. The State-Partyand Control of the AIIB
This idea that the AIIB might serve as a counterweight to the
Washington Consensus assumes that China will dominate the AIIB in
the same, or in an even more extreme way than the United States and
its allies have dominated the World Bank and the IMF. The difference
is that China will use the AIIB to advance its own policy goals and not
the policy goals of the World Bank, the IMF, and the Western values
relating to the environment, workers' rights, transparency in
governance, and non-corruption in government. The use of the AIIB by
the State-Party to further its own goals is fodder for the U.S. criticism
that China will not follow "best practices" in international lending, that
is, the Washington Consensus with its Western-laden values.
Whether the AIIB follows "best practices" as defined by
Washington depends in large part on whether the State-Party will be
able to dominate the AIIB or whether other countries can exercise
enough control so that power is shared. To analyze how power will be
distributed in the AIIB, it is necessary to begin by noting that China
proposed the AIIB, 197 is its largest contributor, 198 and holds veto
power. 199 Additionally, the permanent headquarters of the AIIB are
located in Beijing 2 0 -the capital city of China and the seat of the
Chinese government and Communist Party. 20 1 These facts alone
suggest that China will play a dominant role, but there are other
factors that reinforce the notion that the State-Party will ultimately
control the AIIB.
In China, the Party is able to control every important
governmental or non-governmental organization by installing its own
members in leadership positions.20 2 For example, officials in the
Chinese government hold two positions: a government position and a
Party position; the party position is always supreme to the parallel
government position.2 0 3 Xi Jinping is the current President of the
PRC, 20 4 but this position is largely ceremonial. 20 5 Far more important

197. Supra text accompanying note 6.
198.
Id.
199. Id.
200. ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK, supra note 1.
201.
See The Communist Party of China, CHINA TODAY, http://www.china
today.com/org/cpc/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5EQE-RA37] (archived
Sept. 14, 2016) (using a chart to explain the structure of the National Congress of the
CPC).
202. See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supranote 22, at 119, 134.
203. See id. at 134.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 102.
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is his position as the General Secretary of the Communist Party, the
highest position in the Party hierarchy. 20 6 In addition to these two
positions, Xi is also chairman of the Party's Central Military
Commission, which controls China's Military, the People's Liberation
Army. 20 7 At some points, the Party and the government merge. The
best example is the Central Military Commission, which is both a Party
organ and a government bureau: the members of each organ are
identical. 20 8 Xi's Party positions, not his government position as
20 9
President, are the true source of his power.
By installing Party leaders in all leading government positions,
the Party is able to control the State. 210 This same structure is
repeated in state-owned enterprises (SOEs)-business entities that are
administrative units of the state. 211 An SOE has a corporate structure
"consisting of [a] CEO, [a] Vice CEO, [a] Chief Accounting Officer, and
a Board of Directors similar to the corporate management structure of
firms outside of China .... The Party structure includes a secretary of
the Party Committee, several Deputy Secretaries, and a Secretary of
the Party Discipline Inspection Committee" (discipline is a synonym
for the harsher sounding corruption).21 2 A similar structure exists
within universities. The highest position in a university is not the
President but the Party Secretary, often translated as "Provost" to
avoid causing concern to American partner universities. 2 13 A PRC law
school has a dean, but it also has a Party Secretary who is more
214
powerful.
The AIIB's President Jin Liqun is a former Finance Minister of
China and is, in all likelihood, a senior member of the Party. Although
Jin has not trumpeted his Party affiliations, all important positions in
China are held by Party officials and it is highly likely that Jin, a
former finance minister, and handpicked by the State-Party to head
the AIIB, is a senior Party official. 215 Of course, Jin's specific position

206.
Id. at 103.
207.
Id.
208.
Id. at 134-35.
209.
See id. at 103.
210.
Id. at 134.
211.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Wants a BilateralInvestment Treaty with
the United States, 33 B.U. INT'L L. J. 421, 443 (2015).
212.
Id.
213.
This was explained to the author by a Chinese university administrative
official.
214.
This observation is based upon the author's own experience when a meeting
was arranged with the head of a law school in China and the Party Secretary, not the
dean, held the meeting in his office.
See Mu Chunshan, China's Forgotten Non-Communist Parties, DIPLOMAT
215.
(Aug. 25, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/chinas-forgotten-non-communist-
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within the elites of the Party is not publicly known-a factor that may
be raised in the discussion of transparency, a key World Bank, IMF,
and U.S. international trade condition.
Aside from the President, the powers of the AIIB are vested in the
Board of Governors, which consists of representatives from each of the
Member States. 2 16 The Board of Governors is required to meet once
annually. 217 The AIIB Board of Governors can delegate the general
operational duties of the AIIB to a Board of Directors, 218 which serves
under the Board of Governors and handles the day-to-day operations
of the AIIB. The Board of Governors elects the twelve directors that
comprise the Board of Directors. 219 Unlike the World Bank and IMF,
which have resident directors who live and work in Washington, D.C.,
220
the Board of Directors of the AIIB consists of nonresident directors.
The AIIB Board of Directors will meet "periodically throughout the
year," 221 which has been interpreted by the AIIB to mean quarterly
meetings. 222 The President of the AIIB will recommend one or more
vice presidents to the Board of Directors for approval.2 23 The rest of the
officers and staff of the AIIB shall be appointed by the President
224
without consultation.
It should be apparent that the daily operations of the AIIB will be
conducted by the President, his management team, and his staff, who
will live in Beijing and work at the AIIB headquarters on a daily basis.
The directors of the AIIB are nonresident directors who will live in
their home countries. Contrast this arrangement with that of the
World Bank, which has resident directors who meet Monday, Tuesday,
and Thursday every week to conduct the daily business of the World
Bank.2 25 The directors of the World Bank are full-time employees,
while the directors of the AIIB will likely serve as directors on a parttime basis, since they only meet once every three months. If the work
of the AIIB directors is similar to the work of directors of large business
corporations, the directors' quarterly meetings will consist of reports

parties/ [https://perma.cc/BB4Q-P2L8] (archived Sept. 13, 2016) (discussing the Chinese
Communist Party's "monopoly on power").
216.
AIIB Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, art 22(1).
217.
Id. at art. 24(1).
218.
See id. at art. 23(2).
219.
Id. at art. 25(1).
220.
Id. at art. 27(1).
221.
Id.
222.
See Inaugural Meeting of the AIIB's Board of Directors, supra note 1
(describing the inaugural meeting of the AIIB's Board of Directors); see also Lichtenstein,
supra note 87.
223.
AIIB Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 30(1).
224.
Id. at art. 30(2)-(3).
225.
See WORLD BANK, supra note 86 (describing the board of directors of the
World Bank).
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by the management and a casting of votes on issues that have been
already prepared for discussion by the management team, all
handpicked by the President. With the exception of the Vice President,
the board has no say in the selection of the management and working
staff of the MIB. 226 If the ATIB follows the pattern of other important
organizations in China under the leadership of the Party, it seems
highly likely that senior management will also be Party members or
approved by the Party.
This suggests that the Party, through the President and his
management team, could control the day-to-day operations of the AIIB.
The hand of the Party in running the AIIB seems assured, given its
control over all major governmental and non-governmental
organizations in China, and given that the original idea for the AJIB
came from the Party's Central Committee, which is a group of senior
Party leaders. 227 The control of the AIIB by the Party represents a first
in history: control of a prestigious multilateral institution that consists
of all of the closest allies of the United States but where neither the
United States nor Japan, China's two largest competitors for influence
in Asia, is a member. This is a significant diplomatic and political
achievement for the State-Party and, at the same time, a setback and
an embarrassment for the United States.
B. The AIB and Its Policy Goals
1. The "Beijing Consensus"
Will the AIIB follow international best practices, that is, will it
condition its loans on the Western values of the Washington
Consensus? Or will the AIIB espouse a doctrine of non-interference and
attach few, if any, conditions to its loans? Nowhere in its Articles of
Agreement does the AIIB allude to the doctrine of conditionality.
Article 13 does state that the AIIB will ensure that its operation
complies with "policies addressing environmental and social
impacts," 228 but Indonesia has reported that the AIIB has already
approved a $1 billion loan for projects including coal-fired power
plants 229-projects
blocked by the World Bank for their harmful

226.
227.
228.
229.

AIB Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 30(2).
See Perlez, supra note 7.
AIB Articles of Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 13(4).
BANKWATCH MAIL, NEW BEIJING-BACKED ASIAN

INFRASTRUCTURE

INVESTMENT BANK STRUGGLES TO CONVINCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY

ISSUES 3 (Dec. 2015), http://bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/bankwatchmai163.pdf
[https://perma.cc/829P-H6GX] (archived Oct. 2, 2016).
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environmental impact. 230 The Indonesian government then issued a
statement that "AIIB imposes looser environment requirement[s] in
disbursing its loans, making it the preferred creditor for financing
Indonesia's coal-fired power plant projects." 231 Sensing the political
fallout from such a candid statement, Indonesia retracted this
statement and replaced it with the less provocative statement that
"AIIB-as opposed to other multilateral lenders like Asian
Development Bank or the World Bank-allowed its financing to be
used for Indonesia's coal-fired power plant projects." 232 The Indonesian
project prompted a Bank Watch Group to warn that "the new
beginnings under way at the AIIB threaten to see a return to233the
darkest, unregulated days of international development finance.
Indonesia's posture raises the question of whether AIIB's Asian
borrowers would prefer to have looser controls on environmental
impact, since coal-fired power plants are far less expensive than
alternatives that do less damage to the environment. India, for
example, has huge coal reserves and has also expressed the hope that
the AIIB will approve loans for India to use its coal-fired power plants,
which will put the AIIB "in direct conflict with the World Bank." 234 The
reaction of Asian nations to what they hope will be looser standards by
the AIIB should not be surprising given how developing nations have,
in the past, expressed resentment at the World Bank and IMF's
bullying and arrogance in imposing conditions on loans in ways that
235
humiliated the recipients.
Further support for a doctrine of non-interference is contained in
Article 31(2), which states that the "Bank, its President, officers and
staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall
they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the
member concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to
their decisions." 236 Note too that nothing in the AIIB refers to human
rights or workers' rights. Members of the AIIB, such as Indonesia,
which has a checkered history in human rights, 237 will therefore be
allowed as loan recipients, provided they meet the economic criteria.

230.
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234.
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237.
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https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/Indonesia
[https://perma.cc/L8VY-Z6DN] (archived Sept. 14, 2016).
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China's track record in its recent international trade treaties may
also provide an indication of how the AIIB will function. As noted
earlier, all recent U.S. free trade agreements contain requirements
related to the environment, labor, and transparency. 238 In the past
decade, China has entered into free trade agreements with its strategic
partners, including Costa Rica (2011), Peru (2009), Singapore (2008),
New Zealand (2008), Chile (2008), and Pakistan (2006 and 2009).239
On November 22, 2015, China signed a Protocol to Upgrade the China
Free Trade Agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) (consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darusssalam, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar,
and Cambodia). 240 Many more Chinese free trade agreements are
under negotiation. 241 A hallmark of these agreements-in contrast to
U.S. free trade agreements-is that they do not contain any clauses
242
that pertain to the environment, human rights, or labor rights.
China's refusal to link environmental sustainability and workers'
rights to trade may be one reason why the United States has excluded
China from the U.S.-led negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership

238.
See supra text accompanying note 141-43.
239.
The following are the press releases associated with the agreements. See
Press Release, China FTA Network, China-Costa Rica FTA Entered into Force on August
1 (Aug. 3, 2011) (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cni/enarticle/encosta/encostanews/201108/
7440_1.html [https://perma.cc/54E3-TV6G] (archived Sept. 15, 2016)); Press Release,
China FTA Network, China and Peru Signed Free Trade Agreement (May 9,
2009) (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enperu/enperunews/200910/1215_1.html
[https://perma.cc/8VY4-FCZP] (archived Sept. 15, 2016)); Press Release, China FTA
Network, China-Singaporean FTA Signed in Beijing (Oct. 29, 2008) (http://fta.mofcom.
gov.cnenarticle/ensingapore/ensingaporenews/200910/1204_l.html [https://perma.cc/
6ERX-NB3E] (archived Sept. 15, 2016)); Press Release, China FTA Network, China, New
Zealand Sign Free Trade Deal (Apr. 9, 2008), (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/
ennewzealandlennewzealandnews!200911/1626_1.html [https://perma.cc/6TAK-WKCU]
(archived Sept. 15, 2016)); Press Release, China FTA Network, China and Chile Signed
FTA on Trade in Services (Apr. 15, 2008) (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enchile/
enchilenews/200910/1199_l.html [https:/perma.cc/2AY3-PDBP] (archived Sept. 15,
2016)); Press Release, China FTA Network, China and Pakistan Sign FTA Agreement
on Trade in Services (Feb. 22, 2009) (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enpakistan/
enpakistannews/200910/1220_1.html [https://perma.ccUA3R-EYEU] (archived Sept.
15, 2016)).
Press Release, China FTA Network, Zinhua News Agency Gao Hucheng Is
240.
Interviewed by the Zinhua News Agency on the Successful Signing of the China-ASEAN
FTA Upgrading Protocol (Dec. 2, 2015) (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/
chinadmenendmnews20151229597_1.html [https:H/perma.cc/44M7-7V9F] (archived
Sept. 15, 2016)).
241.
See Free Thade Agreements Under Negotiation, CHINA FTA NETWORK,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta-tanpan.shtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2016) [https://
perma.cc/WA9M-KBSK] (archived Sept. 15, 2016).
242.
See, e.g., China-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, April 8, 2010, ChinaCosta Rica (2011); China-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 6, 2009, China-Peru (2010).
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(TPP), a vast free trade agreement with many of the most powerful
economies in Asia (including Japan, Singapore, Australia, and
Vietnam). 243 The United States may have believed that China would
balk at provisions imposing certain requirements concerning
environmental sustainability and workers' rights. Of course, China has
interpreted its exclusion from the TPP negotiations as shoddy
treatment by the United States, consistent with China's poor
244
treatment in the World Bank and the IMF.
Ultimately, no parsing of the text of the AIIB or China's free trade
agreements will determine whether the AIIB will adhere to the
doctrine of conditionality as currently embodied in the Washington
Consensus and employed by the World Bank and the IMF, or whether
the AIIB will actively promote the doctrine of non-interference. The
AIIB's position can only be determined by an examination of its actual
practices, which may take some years to become clear. It is a safe
assumption, however, that the AIIB will not adopt the Washington
Consensus, laden as it is with Western values. Rather, all indications
are that the AIIB will adopt a different approach, one that may become
known as the "Beijing Consensus." Beyond the doctrine of noninterference, the following sections explore some of the other policies
that might comprise the Beijing Consensus.
2. Promoting China's State-Owned Enterprises
Aside the doctrine of non-interference, the State-Party may use
the AIIB to promote state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs are
business entities that are controlled by the State-Party through a
system of parallel management structures, as stated above, in which
the Party position is always more important than the corporate
position. China has vowed to create "national champions," that is,
SOEs that can compete with the most powerful multinational
companies in the world today. 245 The Party has pledged to "incessantly
strengthen" the "vitality" of SOEs. 246 Although some SOEs have been

243.
See The Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tpp/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
HR6F-79PZ] (archived Sept. 15, 2016).
244.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific
Partnershipto Contain China in InternationalTrade, 17 CHI. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 6).
245.
See China: Intellectual Property Infringement, Indigenous Innovation
Policies, and Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy, Inv. No. 332514, USITC Pub. 4199, at 5-6 (Nov. 2010) (amended).
246.
Bob Davis & Brian Spegele, State Companies Emerge as Winners Following
Top China Meeting, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303559504579195551704526972 [https://perma.cc/E387-KKZH]
(archived Nov. 18, 2016).
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privatized, and SOEs control less of the economy than they did prior to
reforms begun in 1978, SOEs continue to dominate in all vital economic
sectors. For example, SOEs enjoy near monopolies in energy (oil and
gas exploration), transportation (including air and rail transport),
electricity and water supply, and telecommunications. 247 SOEs also
control all financial institutions, including banks, which provide easy
248
credit to finance other SOEs.
In 2011, The Chinese government reported the existence of
144,700 SOEs, excluding financial institutions, with assets worth
$13.6 trillion. 249 The world's largest company by capitalization is
PetroChina, 250 a SOE in the energy sector, ranked ahead of ExxonMobil, which is ranked number two on the 2015 U.S. Fortune 500
list.251 All SOEs are subject to the supervision of the central level
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) of the State Council, China's executive body. 252 The SASAC
is the controlling shareholder in all critical SOEs and regularly rotates
253
its personnel with SOEs over which it exercises its supervision.
Because almost all high ranking government officials are also Party
officials, the rotation of SASAC officials with SOE officials, also Party
members, strengthens the Party's control over SOEs. As SOEs control
all vital industries, the Party's tight grip over SOEs also allows the
Party to control China's economy.
Since SOEs control industries that are involved in infrastructure
development, China can promote SOEs by using the AIIB to make
loans to developing countries to fund infrastructure projects that will

247.

See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 22, at 24.

248.
See Eve Cary, Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises,DIPLOMAT (June
19, 2013), http://the diplomat.com/2013/06/reforming-chinas-state-owned-enterprises/
[https://perma.cc/WVX8-C9NH] (archived Sept. 15, 2016) ("85 percent of loans in 2009
were issued to SOEs, because banks themselves are state-owned, and are directed to let
credit flow to other state-owned businesses.").
249.
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See id. at 734, 740.
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be implemented by SOEs. In other words, China may use the AIIB to
lend money to other countries to buy Chinese goods and services from
SOEs. China could use its own state-owned banks to make these loans,
but the AIIB will add the prestige and legitimacy of a multilateral
lending institution to China's practices. The loans will be made not just
by Chinese banks, but also by a multilateral bank consisting of most of
the world's great powers. The AIIB loans will further legitimize China's
use of its SOEs to fund infrastructure projects under terms that might
not be acceptable to the World Bank. China's SOEs will also benefit
because, after years of building in China, many SOEs now have excess
254
capacity that can be put to use in AIIB-funded projects.
The use of the AIIB to funnel projects to SOEs also portends that
China may not enforce international standards against corruption in
international business. The United States and the World Bank
condition trade on controls on government corruption. 255 China's SOEs
are notorious for their corrupt practices.256 While China has cracked
down on corruption by SOEs in China, SOEs appear to have free reign
in foreign countries to use corrupt practices as a means of doing
business. 257 This is evidenced in reports of corruption by SOEs in
developing countries and by China's failure to prosecute even one case
against SOEs for bribes made in foreign countries under a recently
enacted criminal law 258 that targeted overseas bribery and was passed
as part of China's obligations under the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption. 259 These practices suggest that, unlike the World

254.
See Minxin Pei, China's Slowing Economy: The Worst has Yet to Come,
(Jan. 21,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/01/21/china-economy-growthFORTUNE
slowdown/ [https://perma.cc/NL7K-2W7P] (archived Nov. 14, 2016).
255.
See ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY, supra note 143 (discussing how the World
Bank considers corruption to be a major obstacle in its efforts to end extreme poverty
and how illegal bribes dwarf all development assistance).
256.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China's Crackdown on Commercial Bribery
Threatens U.S. Multinational Companies Doing Business in China, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 511, 528 (2014).
257.
See Xu Yi-Chong, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in Africa: Ambassadors
or Freebooters?, 23 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA, 822, 823 (2014) (describing criticism of
China's SOEs spreading "bad behavior" to Africa in areas of corruption, human
rights/labor rights, environmental pollution, and even crimes).
IlRJPJO
[Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China]
258.
See r
(promulgated by the National People's Congress, March 14, 1997, effective October 1,
1997, revised 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011), art. 164,
http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-law-of-the-peoples-republic-ofchina [https://perma.cc/Y2B4-7NTUI ("Where a person gives money or property to an
employee of a company ...

for the purpose of seeking illegitimate benefits ...

he shall

be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment ...or criminal detention.").
259.
See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Signature and
Ratification Status as of December 1, 2015, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND
CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Oct.
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Bank, the AIIB might not condition loans on controls on foreign
corruption, or may not enforce such conditions.
3. Promoting the RMB as an International Currency
The AIIB's current obligations are to make loans in dollars, but
the AIIB might, in the future, make loans in Renminbi (RMB, or "the
people's currency"). China has been seeking to promote the RMB as an
international currency for some time and these efforts were recently
rewarded when, on November 30, 2015, the IMF declared the RMB as
one of its official currencies. 260 Promoting the RMB will add
considerable prestige to the currency. For example, the Wall Street
Journal stated that
[i]t confers a measure of international legitimacy to China's currency as the
government starts to liberalize its rigidly controlled exchange rate and financial
system. For the Chinese, it is a matter of prestige, a plank in Beijing's strategy
to elevate the country's economic role in the global economy as it challenges U.S.
political and economic dominance around the world.261

Much more than prestige is involved, though: the point missed by
this observation is that China will also gain significant political power
if the RMB becomes an established international currency frequently
used in international transactions.
Today, most international transactions are conducted in U.S.
dollars. 2 62 Transactions in U.S. dollars create great power for the
United States over the international financial system. Trade in U.S.
dollars, even if initiated overseas, requires clearance from banks in the
United States. 263 The United States can effectively freeze any
transaction by blocking the transfer of dollars by U.S. banks. For

12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/CLP9-QDCJ ] (archived Sept. 15, 2016) (listing China as a
signatory to the Convention Against Corruption).
260.
See Krishnadev Calamur, The Yuan as a Global Currency, ATLANTIC (Nov.
30, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.comfbusiness/archive/2015/11/imf-sdr-yuan/418020/
[https://perma.cc/H9HJ-89QR] (archived Sept. 13, 2016).
261.
Ian Talley, IMF Makes Yuan an Elite Lending-Reserve Currency, WALL ST J.
ASIA (Dec. 1, 2015), at Al.
262.
See Ping Chew, Why the Dollar Will Remain the Global Currency,
BLOOMBERG (April 23, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-04-23/whythe-dollar-will-remain-the-global-currency
[https://perma.cc/EFS4-FQBH]
(archived
Sept. 14, 2016) (stating that the dollar is the most widely accepted means of payment for
services and goods in international trade).
263.
See generally IRENE FINEL-HONIGMAN & FERNANDO B. SOTELINO,
INTERNATIONAL BANKING FOR A NEW CENTURY 12-13 (2015) (describing clearance of all

U.S. dollar transactions in the United States and how the United States is able to enforce
sanctions against these transactions and impose the harshest fines and penalties).
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example, the United States can impose sanctions on a country, such as
Iran, by prohibiting the transfer of U.S. dollars through U.S. banks to
Iran. 264 Since oil is paid for in U.S. dollars, the United States can
effectively restrict the sales of oil by Iran through controlling U.S.
banks. In the case of Iran, China was able to circumvent many of the
West's restrictions on buying Iranian oil (using means that are
banking
undisclosed), but was careful not to violate U.S. restrictions on265
because China must deal with U.S. banks on a regular basis.
It is apparent that, if China is able establish the RMB as a
currency that can be regularly used in international transactions,
China can circumvent future U.S. sanctions, because China will not
need to use U.S. dollars or U.S. banks; thus, China will be able to deal
directly with countries subject to U.S. sanctions. In addition, China
would then have the same power to control international financial
transactions in RMB through its control of Chinese banks. China could
suspend or use the threat of suspending RMB transactions through
Chinese banks to add weight to its dealings in international
transactions. Using the AIIB to promote the RMB as a currency
regularly used in international trade not only creates prestige for
China, but could also add immense power over the international
financial system.
V. CONCLUSION

The establishment of the AIIB as a multilateral institution
represents a diplomatic triumph, as China was able to attract dozens
of the United States' closest allies in defiance of U.S. opposition.
Beyond this diplomatic coup, however, there are larger potential
consequences for the future of the international global system. Despite
China's own assertions to the contrary, the AIIB might emerge as a
direct rival to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
This rivalry will consist not only in the amounts of loans made, but also
in the rules of international lending and the rule of international trade
in general. Will China use the AIIB to counter the Washington
Consensus, laden with Western values, with its own approach that
pursues its policy goals under what might become known as the Beijing
Consensus? Aside from the doctrine of non-interference, the Beijing
Consensus might include policies intended to promote SOEs and the

264.
See James Killick et al., How US Laws Can Apply, WHITE & CASE (Oct. 15,
2014), http://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/how-us-laws-can-apply
[https://perma.cc/ZT3G-438B] (archived Sept. 14, 2016) ("The jurisdiction potentially
created by clearing US dollars through a US bank can also significantly extend the reach
of US sanctions laws. Sanctions can prohibit or restrict doing business with countries
(such as Cuba, Sudan, and Iran), individuals or companies referred to as "specially
designated nationals" or "SDNs," which are 'blocked' parties subject to a US asset
freeze.").
265.
Erdbrink, supra note 156.
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use of the RMB as a regularly used currency for international
transactions. In addition to these policies, the Party may well have
other goals in mind. The governance structure of the AIIB, the role of
the Party, and China's own global ambitions suggest that China is
poised to use the AIIB as a policy tool just as the United States and its
closest allies have used the World Bank and the IMF.
The competing roles of the AIIB and the World Bank represent,
for the future, a clash between rival multilateral financial institutions
led by the United States and China. The clash could elevate the
longstanding conflict between the United States and China over the
rules governing international trade to the multilateral policy level for
the first time. This portends a larger struggle over who will write the
rules for international trade in the future.
One option for the United States is to join the AIIB and attempt
to stem the AIIB's influence from the inside. This option, however, is
unrealistic. The United States has indicated that it will not join the
AIB 266 and political realities suggest that such an option would not
pass in the U.S. Congress: joining the AIIB requires a capital
contribution in the billions of dollars to a Chinese-controlled bank-a
move unlikely to be approved by Congress. 267 Even if the United States
did join the AIIB, its role will be carefully limited by the State-Party.
No one in the executive or legislative branches of the U.S. government
should have any illusions to the contrary.
The purpose of this Article is not to choose sides between the
doctrine of conditionality, favored by the United States, and the
doctrine of non-interference, favored by China. Whether one approach
is superior to the other involves a debate about philosophy, politics,
and morality far beyond the scope of this Article. The arguments made
here point out that this debate has been elevated to the multilateral
level and that the State-Party has achieved a breakthrough in gaining
control over a prestigious multilateral peer to the World Bank.
That China will attempt to use the AIIB to further the goals of the
State-Party seems to be a foregone conclusion. It is simply a political
reality that nations often use the multilateral institutions that they
control as policy tools to further their own national interests. 268 Why
should anyone expect China to behave otherwise? This Article also
points out the most evident policies that China might wish to promote
through the AIIB. It would be unrealistic to believe that, while the

Scott Morris, No, The U.S. Will Not Join the AIB, But Here's One Thing it
266.
Can Do, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEv. (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.cgdev.org/
blog/no-us-will-not-join-aiib-%E2%80%93-here%E2%80%99s-one-thing-it-can-do
[https://perma.cc/Y5X7-ZGHY] (archived Sept. 14, 2016).
Id.
267.
268.
For a recent example of the United States uses this tactic to further its
interests at the expense of China see Chow, supra note 244.
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United States uses the World Bank and the IMF to promote the
Washington Consensus and U.S. goals, China will not attempt to do
the same in using the AIIB-under its firm control-to further China's
policy goals. Of course, it is possible that China will not succeed in its
efforts because it might meet effective opposition from other members
of the AIIB. This possibility seems unlikely but, at this point in the
infancy of the AIIB, it is not possible to see exactly how the AIIB's
development will unfold. Yet, it is a development that is worth
watching because it will indicate whether China will begin to succeed
in displacing the United States as the final arbiter of the rules of
international trade in the modern global economy.

